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The View from Northeastern Europe: The Baltic States and the Russian Regime 
By James S. Corum 
Introduction 
If one wants to understand what is going on in Russia and also to look at the most likely main 
confrontation points between the West and Putin the three Baltic States are the best place to start. 
The three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not well known to most Western 
leaders or academics but these small countries are a special place to understand modern Russia 
and its politics. The Baltic republics were not only under Soviet domination, like so many of new 
East European NATO allies, but they were part of the USSR from 1940 to 1991. They had to 
learn Russian (all the people today over 40 are generally fluent in Russian) and the older 
generation had to serve in the Soviet military, As one Latvian general who listens to Russian 
news daily told me, “Unlike the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs who at least had nominal 
independence and some of their own institutions we (Baltics) were part of the USSR– we were 
on the inside – and we KNOW these people.”1 
Only twenty four years ago the three Baltic States were impoverished republics of the USSR. 
The historical memories of the USSR and the KGB and the gulags are all very fresh.  Although 
the Baltics have suffered greatly as people, the people of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are not 
crippled by their historical experience. The majority of the Baltic populations certainly have no 
liking for the Russians but they coexist with them. Baltic Businesses are mainly focused on the 
West, but they do considerable business with the Russians, especially in terms of importing 
energy and raw materials and serving as a transport conduit to Russia from the West. The Baltic 
populations coexist, generally very peaceably, with large Russian ethnic populations that are a 
legacy of the Russian population movements after World War II. Finally, the Baltic populations 
feel considerable security in belonging to NATO and the European Union and their attitude 
towards the Russians is realistic. It’s their neighborhood and they know they have to exist as 
small and prosperous and democratic states next to a very large third world (in most respects of 
living standards), aggressive and dictatorial neighbor. 
English is now the common language of the Baltic young people and the businessmen and 
academics, but Russian is still widely understood and spoken among the over-40 generation 
(who had to learn it in school from a young age). The Baltics follow the Russian media closely 
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(when I lived in Tartu Estonia, one hour from Russia, I had 12 Russian channels on cable TV) 
and read Russian books. Many of the Baltic leaders travel to Moscow on business and high 
school students travel as tourists to nearby St. Petersburg. The Baltic States have world class 
universities (Tartu University, Tallinn Technical University, University of Latvia in Riga, 
University of Vilnius etc. are exceptional modern universities with very high entry standards) 
with some of the top Russian studies faculties in Europe.   
 
After more than five years of living in the Baltics and working with their academics I can say 
that the Baltic governments are all highly realistic in that they understand the reality of small 
democratic nations facing a powerful and highly aggressive dictatorship and the need for allies. 
The Baltic States populations believe, for very good reason, that they face an existential threat 
from Russia, a nation that intensely resents the fall of the Soviet Empire and whose leaders are 
working to restore a new version of the Soviet Empire in which the Baltic States and all former 
republics will have a place clearly subordinate to Russian interests. 
This chapter will examine the view of Russia and the Putin government from the viewpoint of 
the Baltic States and focus on the key areas of friction between the Baltic States and Russia.  
The Weight of History 
History is key to understanding the Baltic and Russian relationship and the relationship with the 
West. First of all, while the Baltic States are geographically in Eastern Europe, in terms of 
culture, economic relationships, religion and political development they are thoroughly Western 
European. The Baltic relationship with the West began in the late 12th century with the arrival of 
merchants, missionaries and crusaders from Germany, Denmark and Sweden. The Baltic regions 
were inhabited by Baltic pagan tribal peoples (ancestors of the Latvians, Prussians and 
Lithuanians) and Finno-Ugric peoples (ancestors of the Finns and Estonians).  By the 1240s a 
group of small states and dioceses had been created in Latvia and Estonia (Livonia) with the 
local tribes converted to Christianity (some voluntarily, some not) and with a German speaking 
upper class ruling the locals who included assimilated local rulers as well. Led by Hansa cities 
which tied the Baltics to trade with Europe, Latvia and Estonia became prosperous. Lithuania 
developed separately and remained Europe’s last pagan kingdom until it accepted Catholic 
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Christianity in 1386 and tied itself by marriage to the Polish dynasty. Along with Finland, the 
Baltic region developed as an integral part of the West in the middle ages in terms of religion 
(Catholic, not Orthodox), its political relationships (tied to the Swedish and Danish Kingdom and 
German Empire), and economics— tied mainly to Germany with as the lingua franca of the 
Baltic states. 
After the state of the Teutonic Knights came apart in the sixteenth century Estonia and Latvia 
became Lutheran and came under the Swedish Empire.  In the 18th Century, under Czar Peter the 
Great, Estonia and Latvia conquered by the Russians. At the end of the 18th Century Lithuania 
was conquered by Russia and the Duchy of Kurland (Kurzeme in modern Latvia) were absorbed 
by the Russian Empire.  But in the period under Russian control the Baltic countries developed 
very differently from the rest of Russia. From the beginning of the Russian takeover the 
provinces of Estonia and Latvia were granted autonomy under the Czar with a council of ethnic 
German barons ruling the region. When Finland was taken from Sweden by the Russians in 1809 
it was, in a similar fashion, granted autonomy as a grand duchy and ruled by an indigenous 
nobility. Both Finland and Livonia, as Lutheran and culturally Western, looked to the West in 
terms of trade and culture. Estonia and Latvia became the richest and most advanced provinces 
of the Russian Empire with universal literacy in the region by 1800 (150 years before Russia had 
universal literacy), and with serfdom abolished more than 40 years before Russia. Lithuania 
remembered its long history as an independent state and duchy associated with Poland and, along 
with the Poles, initiated several major nationalist rebellions in the 19th century. These were, of 
course, suppressed with utter ruthlessness by the Russians but failed to quench the desire for 
independence. Under self-rule, Estonia and Latvia developed more peacefully and by the 19th 
century the Baltic provinces and Finland had an indigenous middle class, extensive trade with 
the West, and was the first region of Russia to become industrialized.  
Yet, through the period of Russian control there was constant friction between the Baltic peoples 
and the Russians largely to the prosperity of the Baltic peoples vis a vis the generally poorer 
Russians and also over the significant role that the Baltic nobility played in running the empire. 
Just read War and Peace to see the friction between the Marshal Barclay de Tolly, commander in 
chief of the Russian Army in 1812 and an ethnic German from Estonia, and the ethnic Russian 
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officers who view de Tolley and his largely Baltic staff with considerable distrust as “Germans” 
who might not be fully trustworthy and committed to the defeat of Russia’s enemies. 
Latvia and Estonia, along with Finland, became the most modern, literate and advanced regions 
of the Old Russian Empire.  In the nineteenth century the Baltic peoples also developed an 
impressive indigenous literature and strong sense of nationalism.  The Baltics retained their 
languages and national culture as very separate from the Russian culture.  The Latvian, 
Lithuanian and Estonian languages (none of which are Slavic) all use Latin letters, not Cyrillic. 
With the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917 the three Baltic States and Finland formed 
indigenous Western style governments and with Western help (German and British help mostly) 
defeated the Red Army in a series of bloody independence wars.2  Russia, soon to become the 
Soviet Union, reluctantly accepted reality and recognized the three Baltic States and Finland as 
independent nations. However, the Soviets remained bitter and hostile towards the Baltic 
republics and the interwar period saw some blatant acts of aggression against the Baltic countries 
to include a failed attempt by Soviet agents to overthrow the Estonian government by a coup at 
Christmas 1924. 
In the twenty years of peace following the end of the independence wars saw the three Baltic 
nations develop as modern Western countries with some measure of prosperity, in contrast to the 
violence, collectivization and poverty prevalent in Russia under Stalin. However, in 1939 the fate 
of the small republics was sealed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 that divided 
Europe into spheres of influence to be controlled by Stalin and Hitler. The three Baltic States 
were part of Europe designated as the soviet sphere of influence, along with Eastern Poland, part 
of Romania and Finland. The Soviet Union was given the green light by Hitler to annex those 
regions. Stalin immediate invaded Finland in November 1939 and after a brief and bloody war 
succeeded in annexing some major parts of Finnish territory. At the same time as invading 
Finland Stalin pressured the Baltic States into allowing large Soviet military bases in their 
countries. The West, at war with Hitler and fearful of antagonizing Hitler’s key ally, did nothing 
to counter this naked aggression against small democratic states. In June 1940 the neutral and 
militarily weak Baltic States were invaded and occupied by Stalin’s forces. The Baltic 
governments were dissolved, the national leaders arrested and murdered. After phony elections 
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the three nations were annexed as part of the Soviet Union and became republics of the Soviet 
Union.3  
The Baltics as Western Nations— The Weight of History 
By June 1940 the neutral and militarily weak Baltic States were invaded and occupied by 
Stalin’s forces. The Baltic governments were dissolved, the national leaders arrested and 
murdered. After phony elections the three nations were annexed as part of the Soviet Union and 
became republics of the Soviet Union.4  Under Soviet domination the three Baltic States suffered 
horrendous oppression as the national elites were either murdered or sent to the Gulags. 
Collectivization and nationalization of farms and industries and businesses imposed. Large 
sectors of the population to include priest and ministers, businessmen, many professionals, 
intellectuals, military officers and landowners were marked down for down for mass arrest and 
deportation.5 The only respite came from the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 
that quickly overran the Baltic States and placed the countries under German control until 1944. 
The Baltic peoples, who had long resented German rulers and who had kicked the Germans out 
in 1919, viewed the Germans as the lesser of two evils and a considerable number of Latvians 
and Estonians fought alongside the Germans during the World War.6  The fact that the Baltics 
had fought so eagerly, and very well, against the Soviet State remains one of the main points of 
friction between the Baltic States and the Russians today.  
After the Soviets reestablished power in the three Baltic States there were massive waves of 
repression lasting until the death of Stalin in 1953.7 This period was characterized by mass 
arrests and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians 
either to the gulags or Siberia.8 The Baltic peoples strongly resisted and large nationalist 
resistance movements were formed in the Baltic States. For almost a decade after the end of 
World War II the Soviets faced anti-communist guerrilla forces, called the “Forest Brothers,” in 
the rural areas of the Baltic States. Not until 1953, after major efforts by the KGB and military, 
were the Forest Brothers effectively suppressed.9  Repressing the Baltics was a bloody conflict 
that lasted for years and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties. The wave of soviet 
repression, that targeted the whole societies including the farmers, small businessmen, 
professionals, and clergy, touched virtually every family in the Baltic States. Most Baltic 
6 
 
families can recall a father who was jailed, an uncle who disappeared in the Gulags, or a 
grandfather sent to Siberia. The memories are still fresh. 
The rest of the Soviet era was one of forced communization and repression. Because the three 
Baltic States were far more economically advanced than Russia, the three countries became a 
center for Soviet high tech and military industries. Thousands of Russian workers were brought 
into Latvia and Estonia to work in the military complexes. The northeastern corner of Estonia 
was declared an area of military industry and cleared of Estonians, who were deported and 
replaced by Russians. Large numbers of Russians were also settled to work in industries in 
Latvia. Only Lithuania escaped the large scale influx of Russian workers, largely because the 
nationalist guerrillas caused so much trouble in rural areas that Stalin’s plans to settle large 
numbers of Russians on collectivized land were foiled.10 
In the late 1980s, when Premier Gorbachev announced reforms in the USSR, the Baltic peoples 
responded with organizing non-communist political parties (quite illegal even under Gorbachev) 
and initiating mass demonstrations opposing Soviet rule. The moist dramatic expression of Baltic 
nationalism and yearning for democracy came in August 1989 when, on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact more than two million Baltic citizens formed a human chain 
several hundred kilometers long through the three states. The chain began in Tallinn Estonia, 
wound through Riga, Latvia and ended in Vilnius, Lithuania. On this day the Baltic peoples 
celebrated their national pride and thousands flew their national flags that they had secretly 
made- a criminal act in the Soviet Union. It was the largest peaceful mass demonstration in 
history. Whatever the local communist leaders had told Moscow, the Baltic human chain was 
clear proof that most Baltic peoples saw the Soviet Union as an occupying force.  
The desire for the Baltic peoples to have an honest account of their relationship with the USSR 
resulted in the Soviet government agreeing to a commission of Baltic and Russian historians to 
examine the events of 1939 and 1940.  For the first time, the Russians acknowledged the secret 
clauses of the pact Molotov Ribbentrop Pact and the People’s Congress of the USSR in 
December 1989 voted to denounce the secret Soviet/Nazi protocols as unjustified and invalid 
under international law.11 Of course, this acknowledgement completely undercut any legal or 
moral foundation for the USSR to retain the Baltic States as subject republics and the 
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independence movement in the Baltic States progressed to open calls for the renewal of their 
independence.  
In defiance of the USSR Lithuania declared its independence in 1990 and held free elections as 
KGB troops tried to suppress the new government in Vilnius in January 1991. Bloody repression 
attempts in Latvia and displays by Soviet forces in Estonia were met with and an overwhelming 
public mobilization against the Soviet government in all three Baltic States. Baltic militia units 
were formed spontaneously and deployed to protect the newly elected national parliaments, town 
councils and other new democratic institutions. Free elections resulted in democratic and anti-
communist governments and national referenda in all three countries overwhelmingly supported 
full independence. With the failed coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
three Baltic States all officially proclaimed independence and were soon recognized by the 
Western nations 
The Baltic States opt for the West 
The reform government in Moscow under Boris Yeltsin that followed the 1991 coup recognized 
the Baltic States as independent nations and for a brief period the Russians and Baltic States tried 
to establish friendly state to state relations.  For a brief period in the 1990s Russia and the Baltic 
States maintained cordial relations. The main thing for the new Baltic democracies was to 
negotiate the withdrawal of all the Russian military bases in the three Baltic States, of which 
there were many. The complex negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian forces and 
the turnover of bases to the national governments in 1994.   
 In 1997 Russia attempted to negotiate a long term arrangement with the Baltic States with 
security guarantees and economic ties to Russia in an attempt to keep the Baltic States neutral 
and far away from NATO. Given the history of Russian guarantees the Russian proposals were 
rejected out of hand and this resulted in some unpleasant diplomatic and economic friction 
between Russia and the newly independent states.12  
In realistic terms, however, what positive things could Russia offer the Baltic States?  Russia was 
broke and suffering from economic and social crisis. The idea of relying on the security and 
protection from a government that had recently killed unarmed Baltic citizens in the 
independence demonstrations of 1990 and 1991 and was developing into an authoritarian mafia 
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state was ludicrous. From a deep knowledge of Russia and the Russians, the Baltic peoples know 
that there was nothing from the old system of the USSR that was worth retaining and there was 
nothing that the new Russia might offer except for cheap energy.  When the Baltic States 
regained independence they immediately chose a path of Westernization of politics, economics 
and defense. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania adopted democratic constitutions and parliamentary 
states, all opted for capitalist market economies with laws on the model of the US and Western 
Europe, and they created new armed forces from scratch, all on a Western/Nordic model and 
equipped with Western weapons and Western doctrine. 
The wisdom of rejecting any long term connections with Russia to support an illusion of 
continued empire and turning completely to the Western model of government and economics is 
evident in the dramatic economic and social progress that some Eastern European countries and 
the three Baltic States made after the fall of the Soviet Empire. The countries that took the 
decision from the start to move fully Western (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
the three Baltic States have become stable and prosperous since 1991. On the other hand, the 
countries that were unwilling to take the plunge towards full democratization and Western 
economics and retained a close association with Russia have been mired in authoritarianism and 
poverty. Starting from a relatively equal level of per capita income in 1991 some Eastern 
European and Baltic States enjoyed very high economic growth rates and have made rapid 
progress towards a Western European living standard while Russia aligned nations continue to 
lag in every standard. One need only to compare the World Bank data (2013) on per capita 
income (GNI) to see that Russia offers nothing positive to countries aligned with it. The GNI for 
Poland was $12,960, Estonia $17,370, Latvia $15,280, Lithuania $14,900. Contrast this with the 
GNI for Russia’s close ally Belarus ($6,720) and the Ukraine ($3960), a country that only last 
year began the move to Westernize.  Even oil rich Russia lagged behind the three Baltic States 
with a GNI of $13,860. 
The Baltic States initially proclaimed a policy of neutrality until the withdrawal of the last 
Russian forces from the Baltic nations in 1994. With this accomplished all three nations 
proclaimed their goal of complete political and economic integration with the West and 
proclaimed their goal to join the NATO alliance.13 The desire to rejoin the West was not a 
rejection of their history but a fulfillment of it as the Baltic States see themselves as 
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fundamentally Western in national culture—despite their eastern geography. The goals of joining 
NATO and the EU were treated with considerable skepticism in the US and Western Europe, but 
from the mid-1990s the Baltic States made a concerted effort to develop economic and security 
policies and institutions that met the NATO and EU standards.14  Most significantly, the Baltic 
States have made an impressive effort to visibly support the West in military operations. All 
three Baltic countries have sent troops to operate under US and NATO command in the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike some other NATO allies and major US partners, the Baltic States 
have sent combat troops and have not placed caveats on the use of their forces in combat. In 
Afghanistan the commitment was significant, with more than 750 Baltic States personnel serving 
there in 2010 and including Estonian and Latvian infantry companies and Lithuanian Special 
Forces as well as support personnel and personnel to man a provincial reconstruction team. The 
Baltic States have also suffered casualties while fighting at the side of the US.15 
 
Putin’s Russia tries to rewrite history-- Again 
Any positive developments in Russian/Western relations ended in 2000 with the rise of Vladimir 
Putin as leader of the Russian state and liberalization measures and tentative steps towards open 
government and democracy were systematically squashed. One of Putin’s main concerns has 
been supporting a new Russian nationalist version of history, which is essentially the old Soviet 
line. Under the current Russian regime history has again been relegated to the role of serving the 
state. The tone and substance of Russian state history publications since 2000-- and almost all 
scholarship is under the control of the state and state allied agencies-- is one of aggressive 
nationalism. This aggressive nationalism also includes a virulent anti-Baltic theme and a 
resounding defense of the Soviet takeover and occupation of the Baltic States after 1940. 
In the history promoted by the Russian government under Putin the official view is that the 
Soviet occupation of the Baltic States was fully justified and those Baltic claims of Soviet crimes 
against humanity (which are carefully documented and detailed by national commissions in the 
Baltic States) are exaggerated. The Russian historical approach under Putin is to portray the 
Baltic peoples as all Nazi supporters in World War II and that any critique of the Soviet Union 
and its role in the Baltics is a “revival of fascism.”16 Baltic attempts to publish accurate histories 
and to gain international recognition of the crimes committed against the Baltic peoples have 
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been met by a Russian information war to discredit the Baltic States internationally.  In 2005 
Kremlin's European affairs chief Sergei Yastrzhembsky rejected the findings of the 1989 
historical commission and the subsequent resolution of the Soviet government on the legality of 
the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in 1940. The Kremlin insisted that the Soviet 
occupation of the three states was done with the approval of the Baltic governments.17 In 2009 
Prime Minister Medvedev set up a commission to combat the “falsification of history” that 
shows the Soviet regime in a negative light.18  This is in accord with the new Russian history of 
the Putin era that now portrays Stalin in a positive light as a great national leader and commander  
One of the key themes of the official Russian media is to depict the Baltic peoples of the 1930s 
and 40s as “Nazis” and to insist that the Baltic peoples remain deeply “Nazi” in orientation, thus 
legitimizing overt Russian hostility in the past and present. The Western support for the Baltic 
States thereby becomes open support for the return of Nazism. For example, a Russian News 
Service denunciation of a film about the Latvians in World War II states, “One wonders if the 
filmmakers stressed the fact that ethnic Latvians were amongst the most enthusiastic and willing 
collaborators with the Nazis during World War II…. The US government is supporting Nazi 
revisionists in Riga (and in Tallinn, Kiev, and Zagreb as well). How low have we fallen?”19 
Russian media cartoons of 2014 show depictions of Latvia with a Hitler and Nazi flag and the 
Russian state media runs articles such as “ Estonian could become a Haven for the Nazis around 
the World”.20 The characterization of all Eastern European, and especially the Baltics, as Nazis is 
a regular theme stressed by Putin. In October 2014 Putin argued that “open neo-Nazism” has 
become commonplace in the Baltic States with the Ukraine as an especially egregious example 
of neo Nazism.21  The Latvian Foreign Ministry replied that Putin was waging an “information 
war” against the Baltics and other European states.22  
Putin’s feelings on the interpretation of history are not a new development. In 1994, long before 
he came to power, at a meeting in Hamburg attended by Putin the Estonian President Lennart 
Meri referred to the Russians as “occupiers” and Putin dramatically stood up and led the Russian 
diplomats out of the conference.23 The state supported Russian media today publishes books 
insisting that the occupation of Lithuania under Stalin was a voluntary act endorsed by 
Lithuanians and that the occupation of Lithuania in 1940 and after World War II was legal and 
proper. These Blatant falsifications of horrendous crimes against humanity are clearly irritating 
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to the Lithuanian and Baltic peoples. But the Baltic governments understand that the actions by 
Russia are essentially part of a long term information campaign to delegitimize the Baltic States 
in the eyes of the world and to whip up the feelings of the ethnic Russian population in the Baltic 
States and to encourage the belief among the Russian population that the Baltic States are an 
imminent threat to Russia. Finally, the Putin regime’s information campaign against the Baltic 
States is meant to encourage the hostility of the Russian public and alert them to the Baltic threat, 
which can only be properly resolved if the Baltics revert to a status of being within the Russian 
sphere of influence as a subject state—something on the status of Belarus. In the state 
propaganda it is Russia’s policy to style itself as the protector of ethnic Russians outside of 
Russia, which is one of the major themes of the books of Project Russia, the ideological 
expression of the Putin regime.24 
In support of the ethnic minorities of Russians within the three Baltic States Russia generously 
subsidizes ethnic Russian groups and political parties and local Russian television programs.  
The propaganda of the Russian regime is prominent in all three Baltic States where it is viewed 
by the Russian minorities who, to a large degree, refuse to assimilate as Baltic citizens. 
Information warfare, conducted over the long term, is a Russian specialty and many of the old 
Soviet propagandists are now working in the service of the Russian state.  In fact, the old Soviet 
media and propaganda organizations simply changed their names and operate today much like in 
the Soviet era—down to many of the old Soviet propaganda themes.  Indeed, Russia has 
conducted a media campaign against Georgia, Moldova and Lithuania in times when Russia 
wanted to coerce those countries to accept Russian policies.25 The non-Russians are fully aware 
of the content of the Russian programming and press as Baltic people over 40 generally speak 
fluent Russian.26 
Russia and the Ethnic Russians in the Baltics 
When the USSR occupied the Baltic States it initiated a policy of mass deportations of Baltic 
peoples and the resettlement of ethnic Russians into Latvia and Estonia especially. In the 1960s 
and 1970s many ethnic Russians moved into the Baltic States to work in the military industries. 
Where, in 1940, the populations of the Baltic States were almost all indigenous but by the end of 
Soviet rule large Russian minorities were established. For example, in 1935 Latvia had a 
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population of 1.48 million ethnic Latvians and 206,000 Russians, in 1989 the population was 
1.388 million ethnic Latvians and 909,000 Russians.27 Estonia, which had only a handful of 
ethnic Russians in 1940 had a Russian ethnic population of 23% by 1991. Almost all ethnic 
Russians remained in the Baltic States after independence of 1991, preferring life as non-citizens 
in the Baltics to life in Russia. Latvia and Estonia have significant Russian ethnic minorities that 
are not well assimilated into the national population.28 Although ethnic Russians in Latvia and 
Estonia can become full citizens by a simple naturalization process that requires only a five year 
legal residency and learning the national language, many ethnic Russians refuse to assimilate at 
The Russian ethnics who remain in Estonia and Latvia have permission to live there and to vote 
in local elections, but as non-citizens, they cannot vote in national elections.29 
 The Russian information campaign against the Baltic States is, to a large degree directed to 
ethnic Russians living in the Baltics as well as the general population of Russia.  The Putin 
regime sees the ethnic Russian populations as a useful fifth column to undermine the three States 
from within and who would naturally ally with Russia, or provide an excuse for Russian 
intervention, should a conflict between Russia and the Baltic States heat up. 
The role of history has played a big role in ethnic tensions as the Baltic governments, 
representing the feelings of the great majority of their populations, have taken down or moved 
communist era memorials that represent the most horrible events of their history. For the Russian 
ethnic minority, however, the memorials to the Red Army and its occupation of the Baltic States 
are a reminder of the glory days of Soviet history. In 2007 the Estonian government’s attempt to 
move a memorial to the Red Army in Tallinn provoked a violent response from mobs of ethnic 
Russians. Both Tallinn and the heavily Russian northeast region witnessed days of violent 
demonstrations and violence that resulted in one death.30 In Latvia and Estonia there have been 
other incidents of mob violence connected with the Russian minorities.  Lithuania is peaceful in 
this regard with only six per cent of its population ethnic Russian. However, the role of 
interpreting history also plays a very important role in the Lithuanian relationship with Russia 
and there is considerable bitterness as well between Russian and Lithuanians over the period of 
Soviet occupation.31 
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Unfortunately, several Russian opinion polls show the success of Putin’s information campaign 
towards the Russian population in portraying the Baltic States as a threat to Russia. Latvia and 
Lithuania are seen as two of the three nations most hostile to Russia in national opinion polls, 
and Russian opinion polls in 2007 showed that 42% of Russians saw Lithuania as “very hostile” 
to Russia.32 On the other hand, Putin is likely to be fooling himself if he believes that the ethnic 
Russian populations in the Baltic States might actively serve as a fifth column to help Russian 
ambitions to neutralize or reoccupy the Baltic States. While the ethnic Russians in Estonia or 
Latvia might take some pride in Putin and voice support for the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, 
few would choose to live in Russia or to see their present situation changed. After all, the ethnic 
Russians of the Baltic States enjoy a far higher living standard than they would in Russia, far 
better social services and benefits, full political freedom, and better pay and opportunity than one 
finds in a depressed, third world Russia. Finally, their status as EU residents allows them 
complete freedom of movement in the EU and to foreign countries. Some of the ethnic Russians 
can be overly nationalistic, but most realize they have a good deal under the present situation. 
Over time ethnic tension will diminish with the aging of the large Russian work force that was 
brought into Latvia and Estonia in the Soviet era and the ongoing assimilation of their children, 
who, unlike their parents, learn the national languages and are more integrated into the social and 
economic life of the country.33 
 
Security Concerns 
All three Baltic States have faced aggressive actions from Russia in the last decade. Estonia in 
April and May 2007 faced a large scale highly organized cyber-attack that was designed to take 
down the government websites and the websites and communications of the banks and large 
businesses. This coordinated attack was most likely the work of Russian groups, although the 
Russian government denied any involvement.34 The Lithuanians, almost completely dependent 
on Russian energy supplies, are made to pay the highest energy costs in the European Union. 
What is most disconcerting is the ratcheting up of open hostility against the Baltic States 
expressed in the highest levels of Russian leadership. In 2013 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Deputy 
Speaker of the Russian Federation State Duma, stated, “Let the puppies (referring to Latvia) bark 
in the world, eventually they will be occupied. ...The entire Baltics will be either occupied or 
destroyed.... definitely."35 Alexandr Dugan, Professor University of Moscow and a leading 
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ideologue of the Russian regime, referred to the Baltic States in a recent interview and noted, 
"Russia considers them an enemy, and makes no special distinctions between them. This view is 
shared by the elite, including  the liberals, and general population. Russia is waiting for a global 
redistribution of power (in the world). For example, should something happen to the U.S., we 
will immediately re-occupy these countries. We will accomplish this either peacefully or by 
force. We have already applied some of the methods to create serious internal problems in 
Estonia and Latvia.“36 
The Baltic States response have been restrained to such open threats to their independence, partly 
because they are members of NATO and partly because they know that in their position as small 
countries that it might be best to refrain from criticizing the Americans or Western Europeans 
until it really matters. Unlike the American government or Western Europeans governments, the 
Eastern Europeans and the Baltic countries, realize that there was never any “reset” with Russia. 
Indeed, the situation has become much worse since the Obama administration announced its 
“reset’ with Russia and outlined a future of closer cooperation. While the US and NATO talked 
of closer cooperation with Russia from 2009 to 2014, and NATO refrained from listing Russia as 
a threat, the last three Russian military doctrines promulgated since 2003, the last approved in 
2010, all explicitly state that NATO is Russian’s enemy and sees the expansion of NATO into 
the Baltic States as one of the main threats to Russia.37 
 
Within the European Union (all three Baltic republics are members) there has been a reluctance 
to challenge the Russian aggressive actions in any meaningful way. Generally, the three Baltic 
States have been fairly quiet in the EU for fear of upsetting the larger Western European nations, 
notably Germany, who are still committed to a closer relationship to Russia. Within the 
European Union the three Baltic States want to be seen as modern and cooperative nations and 
for this reason have been muted in pushing the EU to stronger actions against Russia, as such it 
would only lead to increased friction with Germany, which is a key Baltic trading partner, and 
not likely to succeed.38 
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There is an almost universal consensus among the Baltic government leaders and military (and public) 
that Russia is a direct threat to their existence and that, as small nations, the only sure assurance of their 
freedom is the defense guarantees of the US through NATO. On the other hand, there is a definite fear 
of sounding alarmist and thus irritating the US administration by any overt critique of US policy, or lack 
of policy, to face Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.39 Therefore, the Baltic States have quietly 
worked through NATO to lobby for a realistic view of Putin’s Russia. In the run-up to NATO’s 
publication of the new NATO strategic concept in 2009 and 2010 the three Baltic States In the run-up to 
NATO crafting a new strategic concept, the three Baltic States, along with the Eastern European NATO 
members, mounted a quiet but effective lobbying effort to influence the new NATO Strategic concept to 
ensure that it would recognize the ongoing strategic threat of Russia and that NATO would maintain its 
focus on conventional military deterrence.40  In this the intensive Baltic lobbying effort was successful 
in that NATO did reaffirm territorial defense of the member states as a core mission of NATO.  Still, the 
Obama administration and its pivot away from Europe and the ongoing US force cutbacks in Europe in 
the face of Russian military increases, as well as its reluctance to make a serious response to the Russian 
invasion of the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have left the Baltic nations very worried about the long 
term commitment of the Americans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 The author worked in the Baltic States for the Baltic States from January 2009 to June 2014 as Dean of the Baltic 
Defence College, the higher military education college of the three Baltic States. In that position I worked closely 
with senior military and political leaders and academics of the three Baltic States. I lived and worked in Estonia, but 
my job took me regularly through all parts of the Baltic States. Much of this article is based on the author’s personal 
experience on working for and with the Baltic armed forces.  
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